JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Foreign aid potentially can contribute to democratization in several ways: (1) through technical assistance focusing on electoral processes, the strengthening of legislatures and judiciaries as checks on executive power, and the promotion of civil society organizations, including a free press; (2) through conditionality; and (3) by improving education and increasing per capita incomes, which research shows are conducive to democratization. However, several authors have suggested that aid could undermine accountability processes essential for healthy democratic government, or even encourage violent conflict and coup attempts.
Background
Many foreign aid donors include the promotion of democratic government as a major goal of their aid programs. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) alone spends more than $700 million annually on democracy-related programs, including elections support, the strengthening of parliaments, judiciaries and political parties, and fostering the growth and power of "civil society organizations" such as labor unions and women's and human rights groups (Carothers, 1999) .' Although technical assistance specifically targeted at democracy promotion is a small fraction of all aid,2 the U.S. and other donors often condition grants or loans intended for general budget support on performance in the areas of civil liberties, the conduct of elections, and respect for the rule of law. In 1975, section 116 was added to the Foreign Assistance Act, conditioning U.S. aid on respect for human rights and civil liberties.
Even when awarded for other purposes, aid can promote democracy indirectly by "modernizing" societies. Literacy and increased incomes are key aspects of modernization often believed to increase the demand for democratic government (e.g., Lipset, 1959; Almond and Powell, 1965) . Much aid, of course, is intended to improve economic growth, and many aid programs are targeted at improving literacy and access to education. Empirical studies have linked schooling and per capita income to democratization (Lipset, 1959 ; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Barro, 1997) .
In addition to USAID, most donor nations and numerous multilateral institutions sponsor democracy programs. Even international financial institutions such as the World Bank that do not explicitly promote democratization commit sizeable resources to "good governance" programs intended to strengthen accountability and the rule of law in recipient countries.
If technical assistance and/or conditionality is effective in promoting democratic governance--either directly or through increasing education and income levels-then higher levels of foreign aid receipts should be associated with increases in democracy. In fact, USAID is not hesitant about claiming credit for the spread of democracy, as one of many examples "of what the one half of one percent of the federal budget dedicated to economic and humanitarian assistance has achieved": There were 58 democratic nations in 1980. By 1995, this number had jumped to 115 nations. USAID provided democracy and governance assistance to 36 of the 57 nations that successfully made the transition to democratic government during this period.3
Obviously the fact that many aid recipients have become more democratic does not by itself imply cause and effect. Examples of successful programs in particular countries may convincingly demonstrate that some types of aid can sometimes be beneficial, but tell us nothing about the overall effectiveness of aid in promoting democracy. Furthermore, studies generally find that conditioning aid on reform in recipient nations is largely ineffective (Collier, 1997; Crawford, 1997; Dollar and Pritchett, 1998 Many scholars and aid practitioners have even argued that foreign aid can undermine democratic government. Friedman (1958) has argued that foreign aid is inimical to civil liberties and democracy. Because most aid goes to governments, it tends "to strengthen the role of the government sector in general economic activity relative to the private sector." Democracy and freedom, Friedman and others have argued, are less likely to emerge and to survive where most economic activity is organized by the public sector. Other scholars have argued that aid potentially weakens governmental accountability, by retarding development of a healthy "civil society" underpinning democracy and the rule of law. The evolution of democracy and the rule of law in the West was critically related to monarchs' needs for tax revenues, particularly for fighting wars (Tilly, 1990; North, 1990:113) . Elites who provided monarchs with most of their tax revenues in turn demanded accountability from government. England is the prototypical example, with the Glorious Revolution being the most prominent event in the process of increasing accountability of monarchs to elites, followed eventually by gradual extension of the suffrage. Foreign aid may short-circuit these processes in developing countries, by reducing government's dependence on its citizenry for tax revenues (Karl, 1997:57, 190; Moore, 1998) . With high levels of aid, recipient governments are accountable primarily to foreign donors rather than to taxpayers: "those with the loudest single voice on revenue and expenditure decisions are international lending agencies" (Brautigam, 1992:11) .
High aid levels may also reinforce executive dominance in new democracies, as donors often fund projects outside of the budget, precluding any review by parliament (Brautigam, 2000) . The recent report of the congressionally appointed International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (2000) noted:
The use of IMF resources and conditionality to control the economies of developing nations often undermines the sovereignty and democratic processes of member governments receiving assistance. IMF staff often admit (with pride) that the executive branch of borrowing nations likes to use IMF conditions to exact concessions from their legislatures. While this mechanism may sometimes work to achieve desirable reforms, it often does so by shifting the balance of power within countries in ways that distort the constitutionally established system of checks and balances.
Aid may also encourage coup attempts and political instability, by making control of the government and aid receipts a more valuable prize (Grossman, 1992) , reducing the prospects for democratic governance. It is widely acknowledged that violent competition for control over large-scale food aid contributed to the breakdown of government in Somalia (e.g., Maren, 1997 Findings from these studies are very mixed, and they do not attempt to correct for the possibility that causation might be from aid to human rights rather than the reverse. Nevertheless, the existence of these studies suggests that any causal relationship between aid and democratization could go in either direction. Therefore, the empirical work below, which includes aid from all donors, not only the U.S., explicitly corrects for the potential endogeneity of aid to democratization.
Data and Hypotheses
Beginning in the early 1970s, Freedom House (various years) has annually provided two sets of ratings for all countries, one on the extent of political freedoms, and the other on civil liberties. These ratings have been used by numerous researchers in economics (e.g., Barro, 1997) and political science (e.g., Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994) as measures of democracy. Countries are rated on a 1-7 scale, with higher values indicating less freedom. In the empirical analysis here, the scales are reversed so that a higher value indicates a country is more democratic.
The Appendix describes the criteria used by Freedom House in making its evaluations. The political freedoms index better approximates standard definitions of democracy than the civil liberties index, but the latter better captures many of the civil society dimensions of democracy building that are the focus of many USAID and other donor projects. Civil liberties such as freedom of speech, association, and assembly are necessary for elections to be free, fair, and to represent informed citizen preferences, and thus is an integral part of democracy (USAID, 1998). Therefore, a combined index that ranges from 2 to 14 in value will be used in analyses below.5
From 1972 in perceptions of the experts who provide the democracy ratings, initial levels of income and literacy may also be associated with changes in the democracy indexes. Therefore, levels of income per capita and illiteracy in 1975 are included in the regressions. There is some evidence that democratization occurs in waves. Regardless of whether or not a nation is "modernizing," its likelihood of democratizing is partly dependent on political changes in its neighbors. The "third wave" of democratization (Huntington, 1991) occurred during the period analyzed here, and involved primarily nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Eastern Europe. Dummy variables for each of these country groups are therefore included as regressors. often than not this relationship is not significant at the .05 level in Table 2 . The "third wave" regional dummies are positive, and significant in the majority of cases. Of these, the coefficient for the Latin America dummy is the largest and most significant. Table 2 , that would suggest aid encourages democratization. On the other hand, if aid disbursed later in the period, for example 1990-1999, were more strongly related to democratization (again, measured over the full period), that would suggest aid is allocated as a reward for prior or ongoing democratization. In fact, aid over each of these sub-periods has equally small and insignificant relationships with democratization, when they are substituted for the full-period aid variable in regressions otherwise identical to those in Table 2 . Table 3 reports OLS regressions for specifications that differ somewhat from those reported in Table 2 Results from three additional tests are not reported in the tables for space reasons. First, aid's impact on democratization might depend on the initial level of democracy. Democracy assistance from USAID tends to focus more on countries already experiencing some democratic openings, rather than on hard-core autocracies (Carothers, 1999) , reflecting beliefs about where such aid is likely to be most efficacious. Accordingly, an interaction term equal to the product of aid/ GNP and initial democracy level was added to the regressions. This interaction provided to be insignificant, indicating no general tendency for aid to be more efficacious in recipients with either low or high initial levels of democracy. Second, the insignificance of aid potentially could be attributed to multicollinearity, as aid/GNP is correlated with illiteracy at .56 and with initial per capita income at -.56. However, when either or both of those variables are deleted from the regression, aid remains unrelated to democratization. Third, aid remains unrelated to democratization when the dependent variable used is the end-of-period ( Findings from this analysis should be interpreted with caution, however. For example, results do not necessarily suggest that funding for democracy promotion should be curtailed. The lack of any relationship between aid and improvements in democratic governance does not imply that none of the democracy-promoting projects sponsored by donors has any effects. The available data on aid do not permit disaggregation of aid intended to promote democracy from aid intended to achieve other objectives. The evidence presented here does suggest that either the favorable impacts of aid on democratization are minor, or they are roughly balanced by other democracy-undermining effects of aid dependence. Crosscountry, highly aggregated studies such as this one must be complemented by case study evidence that more closely examines the effectiveness of particular democracy-promoting programs (e.g., Carothers, 1999; McMahon, 2002; Blair, 2002) . Even were such studies to indicate that current approaches are mostly ineffective, that would not imply that no conceivable democracy-promoting efforts would be efficacious. Moreover, the developed democracies may be able to promote democracy through non-aid channels, including trade, foreign direct investment, and diplomacy (Allison and Beschel, 1992 
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